








FBOH THE COKPOK,\TION COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
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records along with which they are to be bound, in accord
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and
the clerks of this court are directed not to receive or file a
brief not conforming in all respects to the aforementioned
requirements."
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the infor
mation of counsel.
M. B. WATTS, Clerk.
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND SUPERSEDEAS
To the Honorable Jtidges of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia:
Your petitioner, Morris Bernard Gutterman, respectfully
represents that he is aggrieved by a judgment of the Cor
poration Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir^nia, entered
upon a rule for contempt against your petitioner, on the
16th day of July, 1938, by which said judgment petitioner
was adjudged guilty of a contempt of said Court and fined
the sum of Fifty Dollars.
A transcript of the record in said proceedings is filed
herewith and from it will appear the following facts:
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On the 1st day of July, 1938, which was the next to the
last day of the June, 1938, term of the Corporation Court
of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, one J. C. Abdell was found
guilty of murder in the first degree and his punishment fixed
at death by a jury in said Court, and on the same date after
the rendition of said verdict said jury was formally dis-
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charged for the said June, 1938, term, and on the 2nd day of
July, 1938—the next day after said verdict, the Court ad
journed for the term, thus completely ending said June, 1938,
term. On the day upon which the verdict aforesaid was
render'&d, said J. C. Ahdell moved the Court to set aside
said verdict and grant him a new trial, and the hearing of
arguments on said motion was set by the Court for the 2nd
day of August, 1938, and said motion was still undisposed
of at the time of the judgment against your petitioner. J. C.
Abdell in the meantime had been remanded to the City Jail
of the City of Norfolk, where he has been continuously con
fined from the date of said verdict to the date of the judg
ment against your petitioner and thereafter.
On the 14th day of July, 1938—twelve days after the ad
journment of the June, 1938, term of the Court and thirteen
days after the rendition of said verdict and the final dis
charge for the term of the jurors rendering said verdict, the
Corporation Court aforesaid issued a rule against your pe
titioner in the following words and figures:
''THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA:
"To the Sergeant of the City of Norfolk, Greeting:.
"We command you that you summon Morris Bernard Gut-
terman to appear before the Corporation Court of the City'
of Norfolk, at the Courthouse of said City, on Saturday, the
16th day of July, 1938, at ten o'clock A. M., to show cause,
if any he can, why he should not be punished for contempt
of Court in that he did on or about the 11th day of July,
1938, take from the Jail of the City of Norfolk, at the in
stance of one J. C. Abdell, therein lawfully confined and
whom said Morris Bernard Gutterman was permitted to visit
in his official capacity as an attorney at law, and of counsel
for said J. C. Abdell in the case of Commonwealth v. Ahdell
pending in our said Court, sundry letters purporting to have
been written by the said J. C. Abdell. addressed to members
of the Jury in said case of Commowivealth v. J. G. Ahdell
and caused said letters to be mailed, all of which was in
violation of the rules and regulations for the safeguard of
the prisoners confined in said Norfolk City Jail, and in the
impedance of the administration of Justice, and in violation
of his duty as attorney at law and as an officer of our said
Court, and be further dealt with according to law. And have
then and there this writ.
"Witness, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of our said Court,
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I  at his office, this 14th day of July, 1938, in the 163rd year
'  of the Commonwealth.
I  ' ''W. L. PRIEUB, JR., Clerk."
'  The rule thus issued was returnable on the 16th day of
July, 1938, on which latter date your petitioner filed his an
swer thereto in these words:
I
"In the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk.
I  "Commonwealth
I  V.
1  Morris Bernard Gutterman.
1
I  "The answer of Morris Bernard Gutterman to a rule
I  issued against him in the Court aforesaid on the 14th day
I  of July, 1938.
'  "For answer to said rule, and without waiving his motion
to quash the same, said Morris Bernard Gutterman says:
" (1) That he did receive from J. C. Abdell, a prisoner in
the jail of the City of Norfolk, whom he was visiting in his
capacity as a lawyer for said Abdell, on the 11th day of July,
1938, certain, letters which he was requested to mail and
he mailed said letters as requested.
"(2) That he did not know to whom said letters had been
written and was unaware of the contents thereof and did
not examine the envelopes in which they were enclosed to
see to whom they were addressed.
"(3) That he did not know of any rules and regulations
of said jail forbidding the receipt and mailing of said letters
by this respondent and does not now know of any such
rules and regulations.
"(4) That he denies that such letters were in 'impedance'
of the administrations of justice (whatever 'impedance' may
mean) and denies further that in mailing the same he was
violating his duty as an attorney at law.
"(5) That in doing what he did respondent thought that
he was simply complying with the innocuous request of an
unfortunate fellow-man, and he did not intend any contempt
for this Court, and did not mean to do anything that might
in the least be construed as reflecting on this Court in any
way, and did not intend to impede or obstruct the adminis
tration of justice in any way, and he does not believe that
justice or its administration has been in the least degree im-
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peded, obstructed or affected by what this respondent did
in the premises.





The answer though not formally sworn to and verified
by petitioner, it was agreed by the attorney for the Com
monwealth and the Court, should be considered as if verified
and sworn to by petitioner and treated and considered as
sworn to by and under the oath of petitioner.
Petitioner did not actively participate in the trial of the
case of The Commonwealth v. J. C. Ahdell, in which the ver
dict aforesaid was rendered, but being a young lawyer in the
office of Mr. W. H. Venable, who'was one of Abdell's chief
counsel, he was present at the trial of said case, rendering
Mr. Venable what aid and assistance he could. To show he
was a mere novitiate in the practice of the law, it is to be
noted that petitioner qualified for the first time to practice
in the Corporation Court of Norfolk on the 6th day of July,
1938, seven days after the verdict against Abdell had been ren
dered.
The City Council of the City of Norfolk has never at any
time prescribed, promulgated or enforced any rules for the
preservation of the property and health of the prisoners in
said City Jail or for the government of the prisoners in
said jail. But the City Sergeant produced certain printed
alleged rules which he testified were prescribed by him and
the personnel of his office, and which were posted in sundry
portions of the jail, but were not posted in the room where
prisoners saw and consulted with their attorneys.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
Your petitioner assigns as error the action of the Court
in entering the judgment against him under the facts and
evidence shown by the Record and in not dismissing the Rule
for contempt issued against him.
This is Petitioner's first assignment of error.
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ARGUMENT ON THIS.
Petitioner was charged in the Rule for Contempt issued
against him with having, at the instance of Abdell, a prisoner
lawfully confined in the City Jail, whom petitioner was al
lowed to visit as an attorney at law in the case of Common^
wealth V. Abdell pending in said Court, received from said
Abdell and mailed certain letters written by said Abdell to
members of the jury in the said case of Commonwealth v.
Abdell, all in violation of the rules and regulations for the
safeguard of the prisoners confined in said jail and in the im
pedance of the administration of Justice and in violation of
his duty as attorney at law and as an officer of the Court.
In his answer to said Rule, petitioner admitted receiving
from and mailing for Abdell while in jail certain letters, but
he avers in said answer that he did not Iniow the contents of
said letters, did not know to whom they had been written
and did not examine the envelopes in which they were en
closed to see to whom the letters were addressed; that he
did not at that time and at the time of his answer know of
any rules forbidding his receiving and mailing such letters;
he denied that such letters so received and mailed by him
were in impedance of the administration of justice or that in
receiving and mailing the same he was violating his duty as
an attorney at law; that in doing what he did he thought he
was simply complying with an innocuous request of an unfor^
tunate fellow-man, and did not mean to do anything whmh
might be construed as a contempt of Court, and did not intend
to impede or obstruct the administration of justice in any way •
and he did not believe that justice or its administration had
been impeded, obstructed or affected in the least by what he .
had done.
The evidence and facts show that there were no legal rules
in existence for the government of the City Jail of the City of
Norfolk. Section 2859 of the Code of Virginia authorized the
City Council to make such rules, and it is an admitted fact
that ,no such rules were ever made or prescribed, promul
gated or enforced by the Council. In 50 Corpus Juris., p.
332, section 10, it is said:
*'The supervision of prisons being a legislative function
is regulated by statutes, the provisions of which must be ob
served. These functions can only be performed by the officers,
boards or other authorities to whom they have been intrusted
by law. The rules and regulations for the government of
prisons must be adopted by the appropriate authorities in
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the manner prescribed and must be within the limits pre
scribed by law."
The so-called rules produced by Mr. Lawler, the City Ser
geant, and certified as an exhibit with his evidence, are in
fact no rules at all in a legal sense, but even if they were there
is nothing in them forbidding any person from mailing letters
at the request of a prisoner, and certainly even if there had
been a violation of any such rule so made it would not have
been a criminal offence and certainly could not constitute
a contempt of Court. The rules produced by Mr. Lawler,
so far as they touch the subject matter here, are in the fol
lowing words:
''Prisoners will, except when the privilege is suspended in
the public interest or as punishment for breach of Jail rules,
be allowed reasonable opportunity to correspond vdth rela
tives and friends, and prisoners shall have the right at all
times to write freely to the Sergeant and Judge. (Federal
prisoners shall be allowed to write to the United States Mar
shal or to the Bureau of Prisons at Washington, D. C., with
out censor, regarding the conditions at the Jail, and the treat
ment accorded them.)
"Mail for prisoners will be carefully examined by deputies.
When mail is received for a prisoner who fails or refuses
to authorize the Deputy to inspect same before delivery to
prisoner, such mail will either be returned to the sender or
held until such prisoner is released from JaU."
There is nothing here to forbid the receiving letters from
and mailing letters for prisoners. At any rate a violation
of a rule—even had snch a rule existed—^made by a jailer can
not be classed as a contempt of court.
In addition to this, these so-called rules, while posted in
some places in the jail, were not posted in the room provided
for consultation of prisoners and their attorneys, and defend
ant's answer that he never knew or heard of any such rule,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is conclusive, and,
considering that he was a mere beginner in the practice of the
law, is impressive.
And so it is apparent that the petitioner had violated no
rules; that, in fact, no real legal rules were in existence,—
that the alleged rules produced did not forbid the mailing
of letters at the request of a prisoner, and, finally, that even
if such rules did forbid it, the petitioner was ignorant of the
same and acted with an innocent intent in mailing these let
ters.
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In this connection it is well to remember that, as stated in
Vol. 2 Barton's Law Practice (2nd Ed.), p. 778, "A person
offering to purge himself of contempt must do it in person,
and usually his answer must be taken as true and cannot be
traversed, but it must be credible and consistent with itself,
or the court may draw its own inferences from the facts
stated".
Again in Postal Tel., etc., Co. v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 88
Va. 929, 931, it was held that:
''Where it is clear from the character of the alleged act
and from the answer of the party that there was no intention
to disregard the injunction, he ought not to be adjudged guilty
of contempt. The idea of a technical contempt, committed by
accident or misadventure, cannot be supported, under the
authorities, where the intention—the malo animo—is wholly
wanting.''
. See also in accord: Trwible v. Com., 96 Va. 818.
Therefore, even if it were possible to stretch and extend
the power of the Court to fine for contempt to cover the viola
tion of rules (so-called but not existent in the instant case),
under these authorities the trial Court erred in fining the
petitioner for contempt, when he acted in such good faith.
But it is said that the letters petitioner mailed were letters
to the individual members of the jury, and that such letters
constituted contempt of court and that the defendant in mail
ing them was guilty of contempt along with the writer; that
such letters were an "impedance" of justice, and constituted
an obstructing of the administration of justice, and in mail
ing them petitioner, as an officer of the Court, was guilty of
misbehaviour and became liable for contempt of Court.
In the argument on the Second Assignment of Error here
inafter contained, your petitioner points out that there is a
total lack of evidence to show that the letters to the individual
members of the jury from Abdell were the same letters which
your petitioner mailed. Petitioner will not repeat here what
is there said on this question, but does refer to it at this point
and asks that it be read and considered as if repeated at this
place in this petition.
Passing now to the other questions involved here, and con
ceding, solely for the sake of argument and for no other pur
pose, that the letters to the indiyidual jurymen from Abdell
were the same letters mailed by your petitioner, it should
first be observed that as shown by the answer of the pe-
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. titioner, unimpeaclied and uncontroverted in any way, that
petitioner at the time of receiving said letters and mailing
them did not know their contents and did not know to whom
they were addressed, and did not examine the addresses on
the envelopes in which they were mailed, and in all respects
was innocent of any wrongful intention. Under the authori
ties hereinbefore cited as to the effect of the answer of pe
titioner and as to the innocent intention of petitioner and
his good faith, it seems clear that in this view of the matter,
the Court below erred in finding your petitioner guilty of con
tempt of court. This is too clear to call for further elabora
tion or extended discussion.
Going even beyond tliis and coming to an examination
of whether Abdell's letters to the individual jurymen can it
self be held to be a contempt of court, we reach a very in
teresting, although in petitioner's view academic in his case,
question.
It will have been noted that these letters were written more
than ten days after the verdict against Abdell had been ren
dered and the jurymen had been discharged not only from
the consideration of his case, but for the June, 1938, term of
the Court at which said verdict was rendered, and in fact ten
dnys after the final and complete adjournment of said June
term of the Court, and the question is, were said letters so
written a contempt of court!
On this question no direct precedent is discoverable, but
analogous precedents seem to point to a negative answer.
In 6 Rul. Case Law, p. 694 (the text to note 17), it is said
that attorneys are guilty of contempt ''in making insulting
and unjust imputations against a juryman luJiile serving as
such" (italics supplied). To sustain this the sole and only
case cited is the English case of In re Pater, 5 B & S 299-
15 Eng. Rul. Cas. 140. " '
In Vol. 7 Halsbury's Laws of England, p. 291, section 624,
the same case is cited to support a text as follows: "The
court will punish as contempt an insult to a juryman while
performing his duty" (italics supplied).
It will be noted how carefully the law is limited bv the
words, "while serving as such" and "while performing his
duty". The English case cited was a case in which, on and
in the midst of a trial in the court itself an attorney grievously
slurred at and insulted the foreman of the jury. That is not
the case here, where the verdict had been reached, the juiy-
men discharged for the term and the term of the court finally
adjourned and ended for more than ten days. The power of
the Court to protect a juryman on and during the trial of a
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case or even during the term by its process of contempt does
not extend to the protection of a juryman for the balance of
his natural life from insults or abuse because of a verdict
in Avhich he has concurred. The line must be drawn some
where, and its utmost extent of protection would seem to go
only to the protection of jurors during the term for which
they are serving from such insults and abuse.
Whether,the letter of Abdell was abusive or insulting is
itself questionable; it seems more a cry of distress proceeding
from an agonized and mentally tortured human, upbraiding in,
some respects the jury for his conviction in the face of his as
serted innocence; there is no insulting language in it and in
- it the writer declares, "I realize, there is little or nothing you
can do about it now". Always such letters are viewed mth
charity as not proceeding from a person normally situated,
and to hold such letters contempt of court is to act with
rigor unabated and callous. If a person situated as Abdell
was could derive inner consolation from such a letter, although
it could avail him nothing, why deny him that solace? It
would be inhuman to do so. Religious and lay history is re
plete with such incidents. The patience of Job is prover-
bialj but even he upbraided some of his visitors because of their
views of his situation and the causes from which it resulted.
Resuming an examination of the precedents applicable to
this case, although none have been found relative to a petit
jury there are two relative to a grand jury that are more than
persuasive here.
In Storey v. People, 79 111. 45, 22 Amer. Rep. 158, Storey
had published in the Chicago Times while the Grand Jury
was^ in session, but after it had found certain indictments
against him, a libellous article reflecting upon the action of
the Grand Jury in finding such indictments. The trial court
held he was guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to
imprisonment. In reversing the judgment, Scholfield, J., says:
''The only question, therefore, is, assuming the articles to
be libelous, whether the publishing of a libel on a grand jury,
or on any of the members thereof, because of an act already
done, may be summarily punished as a contempt.
"We do not understand the articles as having a tendency
directly to impede, embai-rass or obstruct the grand jury in
the discharge of any of its duties remaining to be discharged
after the publications were made. No allusion is made to
any matter upon which the members were thereafter to act,
and there could, therefore, of necessity, be no attempt to in
terfere with the exercise of their free and unbiased judg-
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iiienis as to sueli matters. No attempt is made to induce dis
obedience in officers or witnesses, and it does not appear that
any direct interference with the administration of the law
was in contemplation. All that it would seem could be claimed
is, that the publications would cause disrespect to be enter
tained by the public for the grand jury, and for its action
in the particular cases criticised, and thereby tend, to that
extent, to bring odium upon the administration of the law.
That this is a grave offense, deserving of prompt and severe
punishment, might be conceded, without, in the slightest de
gree, strengthening the position that it may be treated and
punished as a contempt of court. The law, presumably, pro
vides an adequate punishment -and mode of procedure to pro
tect society against all offenses, and neither the magnitude
of a crime, nor the probability of its frequent repetition, has
ever been held to authorize the courts to depart from the mode
of trial prescribed by the law, or to impose a different punish
ment from that which it sanctions."
In State v. Young, 113 Minn. 96, Ann. Gas. 1912 A. 163,
the defendants were instrumental in having submitted to a
grand jury certain evidence of alleged violations of the liquor
law. The grand jury considered the evidence, but refused to
indict. While the grand jury was still in session the de
fendants presented to the Court a petition, in which it was,
ill elfect, asserted that the grand jury had failed to give proper
consideration to the charges, had refused to hear all the
evidence attainable, and had grossly failed in the performance
of their duties. The petition contained severe and point,ed
criticism of the grand jury and in effect charged a wilful neg
lect of duty, ancl was verified by the defendants. Thereupon
certain members, of the grand jury presented and hied with
the court an afhdavit charging and asserting that many of
the statements contained in the petition were untrue; that
in filing said petition defendants attacked the dignity and
integrity of the court and the grand jury thereof, and by
insult and aspersions tended to bring the court and grand
jury into discredit and disrepute, thereby obstructing and in
terfering with the administration of justice in said court, and
the affidavit prayed that the defendants be punished for con
tempt. On order to show cause defendants were fined $50
each for contempt of court. In reversing this judgment of the
lower court. Brown, J., inter alia, says:
"It is elementary that publication in newspapers, or im
pertinent, scandalous, or contemptuous language inserted in
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pleadings, affidavits, or petitions filed in court, concerning a
pending cause, by which it is sought to influence the action of
the court therein, and prevent a fair and impartial hearing,
thus embarrassing the due administration of justice, consti
tute a contempt of court and may be summarily punished. But
by the weight of authority the rule does not apply to pro
ceedings which have been fully terminated and brought to a
close by final decision ^  .
''"We are of the opinion that the final report of the jury
that the matters had been considered and no indictments
found, finally ended the proceedings before the jury, and
that the presentation of the petition by the defendants asking
for a resubmission thereof was not a contempt of court. The
petition in so far as a criticism of the action of the jury, con
cerned a past transaction, and does not come mthin the rule
applicable to a pending proceeding * * * ,
"The improper interference with the administration of
justice is the foundation of all contempt proceedings, and this
does not follow from facts like those at bar.
"The case is substantially like Storey y. People, 79 111. 45,
22 Amer. Rep. 158. In that case the grand jury had reported
an indictment against Storey, the publisher of a newspaper,
who immediately thereafter composed and published in his
paper a severe arraignment .of the jury, while they were still
in session, charging corruption and misconduct. It was held
that the authority of the grand jury in the particular matter
terminated with the return of the indictment, and the editor
was not subject to punishment for contempt, and that the
remedy against him was either a civil action for damages
or prosecution for criminal libel. The decision has been
widely cited with approval by other courts. 4 Notes to 111.
Reports 315. * * *
"There can be no substantial distinction, so far as con
cerns a termination of the authorities of the grand jury,
between a case where an indictment is returned and one
where the jury reports no indictment as the results of their
consideration of the charge. In either case, in the absence
of express directions from the court, the authority of the jury
ceases with the report."
Petitioner's case is stronger for reversal on this point than
either of the two cases last cited. Here the jurors had finally
exercised their authority and been discharged, and the court
had adjourned for the term. In those cases the grand jury
was still in session, the jurors had not been discharged and '
the term of the court was still in session.
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As intimated the question on this phase of the ease may
perhaps be academic and need not be decided because on the
other phases of the case, for reasons already set forth, the
Rule for contempt against petitioner ought to have been dis
missed.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
As shoAvn by Bill of Exception No. 2, the trial court ad
mitted as evidence against petitioner the letters from Abdell
to the individual jurors over the objection and exception of
petitioner on the ground that there was no evidence to connect
petitioner with the writing or mailing of said letters or in
any way. Your petitioner assigns as his second assignment of
error the action of the court in admitting said letters in evi
dence.
ARGUMENT ON THIS.
The rule against petitioner charged him with mailing such
letters to the individual jurors, and the burden was on the
Commonwealth to prove that he did mail such letters by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner admitted in his an
swer that he mailed certain letters for Abdell, but did not
know the contents of them or to whom they were addressed;
in other words, petitioner was himself ignorant of what let
ters he did mail or to whom the letters mailed by him were
addressed. The Commonwealth based its whole case on his
having mailed for Abdell to the individual jurors the letters
produced in evidence, and it had to prove that fact bevond
a reasonable doubt.
There is no e\ddence whatsoever in the record and no facts
identifying the letters received by the individual jurors as
the letters which petitioner did mail for Abdell. There is no
evidence in the record that no other person than your pe
titioner mailed letters for Abdell—and it may have been that
the letters to the jurors were mailed by others; for instance,
by some fellow-prisoner whose time expired on the day they
were mailed. The letters actually mailed by petitioner may
have been letters to friends or relatives, and there is noth
ing to show that Abdell wrote letters to the jurors exclusively
and to no other persons. To hold that petitioner mailed
these letters to the individual jurors is a determination based
on surmise and conjecture and not on proof beyond a reason-
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ahle doubt; indeed, petitioner, himself, who did actually mail
certain letters for Abdell, cannot say he mailed the letters to
the individual jurors, because he does not know whether he
did or not; that is, he simply knows he mailed certain uniden
tified letters, but neither he nor the Court can assert that
the letters he did mail were the letters produced in evidence.
That in case, like this, of crimipal contempt—^not of civil
contempt as in Roanoke Water Works Co. v. Roanoke Glass
Co.f 151 Va. 229, it is well settled that the Commonwealth
must prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Kidd v. Commonwealth, 113 Va. 612, Judge Whittle says
of such proceedings and in a case quite similar to this:
*'The object of this proceeding is to punish the appellants
for an alleged contempt, and it is criminal or quasi criminal
in its nature, and the rules of evidence applicable in criminal
cases prevail. Mere preponderance of evidence is not suffi
cient to convict, hut the offense must he proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.'' (Italics supplied.)
In Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, the court says:
''In criminal contempts, as in criminal cases, the presump
tion of innocence obtains. Proof of guilt must be beyond
reasonable doubt, and the defendant may not be compelled
to be a witness against himself."
In State v. Fredlock (W. Va.), 94 Am. St. K-. .932, we find
the following:
"It is very well established that a contempt of court is
in the nature of a criminal otfense, that its punishment is
criminal in its character, and that the evidence must be suffi
cient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order
to convict."
It is submitted that the Court erred in admitting the let
ters to the individual jurors in the face of an entire lack of
evidence connecting petitioner with the mailing or writing of
those letters.
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RECAPITULATION.
The Rule against petitioner should be discharged for the
following reasons:
(1) There was no valid rule of any sort governing the jail
of the City of Norfolk forbidding prisoners, or others for
them, from mailing letters.
(2) The alleged rule relative thereto contained in the cer
tificate of the exhibit filed with the testimony of the witness,
Lawler, does not forbid the mailing of letters for prisoners,
but it does, if it is valid at all, allow prisoners to write un-
censored letters to relatives and friends, and there is no evi
dence to show that the letters mailed by petitioner were not
to relatives and friends.
(3) The violation of a mere jail rule with which the Court
has had nothing to do and has not ordered to be observed, is
not and can never be a contempt of court.
(4) The evidence does not show bejmnd a reasonable doubt
that petitioner mailed for Abdell the letters received by the
individual jurors, and such letters should not have been ad
mitted in evidence.
(5) The answer of defendant, uncontroverted, unchallenged
and uncontradieted, is conclusive that he acted in good faith,
with no evil intention and absolves him from any contempt of
court.
(6) The letters of Abdell to the individual jurors was not
itself a contempt of court and did not obstruct the adminis
tration of justice, written as they were after the jury had
acted, the jurors had been discharged and the term of the
Court ended. Again said letters were not abusive and in
sulting. The letters themselves not being a contempt of court,
the mailing of them, which is not shown could not have been
a contempt.
(7) Even if the petitioner should not have done what he
did, it at the most was a mere indiscretion and not a contempt
of court and considering his youth, inexperience and that he
is a mere tyro at the Bar, the court, even if desiring to be
rigorous and severe, should have contented itself with a
mild admonition and not have affixed to petitioner at the
outset of his professional career an apparent stigma in the
form of a fine for contempt. Prom any the most severe
standpoint the evidence of any guilt was meager, and the legal
question was in every phase difficult and doubtful. To have
absolved petitioner would not have lessened but increased
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the public respect for the court, whose dignity can never be
vindicated by imposition of punishment where any other
course would have served the same purpose.
PRAYER.
For the reasons assigned in this petition your petitioner
IDrays that he may be granted a writ of error and supersedeas
to the order and judgment herein complained of judging him
guilty of contempt and fining him $50; that said order and
judgment may be reviewed, reversed and annulled, and that he
may be allowed to give bail pending these proceedings in this
court for his appearance before the Corporation Court of
the City of Norfolk at such future time as said last mentioned
court shall designate subsequent to the final judgment of this
court herein.
CONCLUSION.
(1) Petitioner adopts this petition as his brief in this case.
(2) Petitioner will on the 22nd day of August file this pe
tition and the record therein mentioned with Justice Claude
Vernon Spratley, and has this 9th day of August, 1938, de
livered to the attorney for the Commonwealth in the City of
Norfolk a copy of this petition, so that said attorney may
file with said Justice within the time fixed by law any reply
thereto counsel may be advised.
(3) Counsel has transmitted to the Clerk of the Supreme
Court of Appeals at Richmond $1.40, the filing fee in this
case.
(4) Counsel for petitioner desires to argue this petition
orally on its consideration by Justice Spratley.
MORRIS BERNARD GUTTERMAN,
By Counsel.
NATHL. T. GREEN, p. p.
I, Nathaniel T. Green, an attorney practicing in the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that
in my opinion the order and judgment complained of in the
foregoing petition should be reviewed, reversed and annulled.
Given under my hand this 9tli day of August, 1938.
NATHL. T. GREEN.
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C. V. S.
Writ of error and supersedeas awarded, said supersedeas^
however, not to operate to discharge the prisoner from cus




Received August 25, 1938.
M. B. WATTS, Clerk.
Copy of the above petition delivered to and received by me





Pleas before the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk,
on the 9th day of August, 1938.
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: On the 14th day
of July, 1938, a Rule was issued against Morris Bernard





The Court doth direct that a rule be issued against Morris
Bernard Gutterman, directed to the Sergeant of the City of
Norfolk, commanding him to summon the said Morris feer-
nard Gutterman to appear before this Court on the 16th day of
July, 1938, at ten o'clock A. M., to show cause if any he can,.
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why he should not be punished for contempt of Court in
that he did on or about the 11th day of July, 1938, take from
the Jail of the City of Norfolk, at the instance of one J. C.
Abdell, tlierein lawfully confined and whom said Morris Ber
nard Gutterman was permitted to visit in his official capacity
as an attorney at law, and of counsel, for said J. C. Abdell in
the case of Commomvealth v, Abdell pending in our said
Court, Sim dry letters purporting to have been mitten by the
said J. C. Abdell addressed to member of the Jury in said case
of Commonwealth v. J. C. Abdell and caused said letters to be
mailed, all of which was in violation of the rules and
page 2 } regulations for the safeguard of the prisoners con
fined in said Norfolk City Jail, and in the impedance
of the administration of Justice, and in violation of his duty
as attorney at law and as an officer of our said Court, and
be further dealt with according to law.
The following is the rule and return of the Sergeant of the
City of Norfolk pursuant to the foregoing order:
RULE.
THE COMMONWEALTH OP VIRGINIA:
To the Sergeant of the City of Norfolk, Greeting:
We command you that you summon Morris Bernard Gut
terman to appear before the Corporation Court of the City
of Norfolk, at the Courthouse of said City, on Saturday the
16th day of July, 1938, at ten o'clock A. M., to show cause,
if any he can, why he should not be punished for contempt
of Court in that he did on or about the 11th day of July, 1938,
take from the Jail of the City of Norfolk, at the instance of
one J. C. Abdell, therein lawfully confined and whom said
Morris Bernard Gutterman was permitted to visit in his
official capacity as an attorney at law and of counsel for said
J. C. Abdell in the case of Commomoealth v. Abdell pending
in our said Court, sundry letters purporting to have been
written by the said J. C. Abdell addressed to members of
the Jury in said case of Commonwealth v. J. C. Abdell and
caused said letters to be mailed, all of which was in violation
of the rules and regulations for the safeguard of the prisoners
confined in said Norfolk City Jail, and in the im-
page 3 [ pedance of the administration of Justice, and in
violation of his duty as attorney at law and as an
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
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officer of our said Court, and be further dealt with according
to law. And have then and there this writ.
Witness, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of our said Court, at his
office, this 14th day of July, 1938, in the 163rd year of the
Commonwealth.
W. L. PEIEUR, JR., Clerk.
RETURN OF CITY SERGEANT.
Executed in the City of Norfolk, Va., this the 14 day of
July, 1938, by serving a copy hereof on Morris Bernard Gut-
terman in person.
IjEE p. LAWLER,
Sergt. City of Norfolk, Va.
By: C. B. LESNER, Deputy.






This day came the defendant, Morris Bernard Gutterman,
in person and by counsel, in pursuance to a rule issued against
the said defendant on the 14th day of July, 1938, and return
able to this date. And thereupon the said defendant, by his
counsel, moved the Court to quash and dismiss the said rule,
which motion having been fully heard by the Court,
page 4 [• is overruled, to which action of the Court in over
ruling said motion, the defendant, by counsel, duly
excepted, and thereupon the said defendant filed in writing
his answer to said rule, and the whole matter of law and fact
was heard and determined by the Court. Whereupon it is
considered by the Court that the said defendant is in con
tempt of this Court and that he be fined the sum of Fifty
Dollars, and be required to pay the costs of his prosecution.
Thereupon the said defendant, by counsel, moved the Court
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to set aside its judgment and grant liim a new trial on the
grounds that the said judgment is contrary to the law and
the evidence, which motion having been fully heard by the
Court, is overruled, to which action of the Court in overruling
said motion, the defendant, by counsel, duly excepted. There
upon the said defendant, by counsel, moved the Court for
time to appty for a writ of error to the foregoing judgment,
which motion having been fully heard by the Court, is sus
tained, and the execution of the aforesaid judgment is hereby
postponed until the 16th day of September, 1938. And there
upon the said Morris Bernard Gutterman, with S. Gutterman,
as surety, were each duly recognized in the penalty of One
Hundred Dollars, conditioned that the said Morris Bernard
Gutterman shall appear before this Court on the 16th day of
September, 1938, at ten o'clock A. M., or at such other time
or times to which the said proceedings may be continued or
heard, to answer for the offense with which he stands charged,
the said recognizance to remain in full force and effect until
the charge is finally disposed of, or until it is declared void
by order of this Court.
The answer referred to in the foregoing order
page 4-A } as filed by the defendant is as follows:




The answer of Morris Bernard Gutterman to a rule issued
against him in the Court aforesaid on the 14th day of July,
1938.
For answer to said rule, and /vdthout waiving his motion
to quash the same, said Morris Bernard Gutterman says:
(1) That he did receive from J. C. Abdell a prisoner in the
jail of the City of Norfolk, whom he was visiting in his capacity
as a lawyer if or said Abdell, on the 11th day of July, 1938,
certain letters which he was i*equested to mail and he mailed
said letters as requested.
(2) That he did not know to whom said letters had been
written and was unaware of the contents thereof and did not
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examine the envelopes in which they were enclosed to see
to whom they were addressed.
(3) That he did not know of any rules and regulations of
said jail forbidding'the receipt and mailing of said letters by
this respondent and does not now know of any such rules
and regulations.
(4) That he denies that such letters were in ''impedance"
of the administrations of justice (whatever "im-
page 4-B [• pedance" may mean) and denies further that in
mailing the same he was violating his duty as an
attorney at law.
(5) That in doing what he did respondent thought that
he was simply complying "with the innocuous request of an un-^
fortunate fellow-man and he did not intend any contempt for
this Court and did not mean to do anything that might in the
least be construed as reflecting on this Court in any waj'- and
did not intend to impede or obstruct the administration of
justice in any way and he does not believe that justice or
its administration has been in the least degree impeded, ob
structed or affected by what this respondent did in the
premises.
He therefore prays that the rule herein may be discharged
and dismissed.
MORRIS BEENABD GUTTERMAN.
NATHL. T. GREEN, Attorney.





And now, in said Court on the 9th day of August, 1938.
This day came Morris Bernard Gutterman by his attor
ney after reasonable notice in writing to John M. Arnold,
attorney for the Commonwealth in the City of Norfolk, of
the time and place when and where the hereinafter men
tioned bills of exceptions would be tendered to the Judge
of this Court and wuthin 60 days since the entry of the order
herein on the 16th day of July, 1938, and tendered his two
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bills of exceptions numbered respectively No. 1 and No. 2 and
prayed that the same might be signed, sealed and made a part
of the record in this cause, and the same having been accord
ingly done said Bills of Exceptions are hereby directed to be
and are accordingly made a part of the record in this cause.
The following are the Bills of Exception referred to in the
foregoing order:




BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1.
Be it remembered that on the return day of the Rule here
in against Morris Bernard Gutterman, the defendant herein,
to-wit, on the 16th day of July, 1938, the said defendant ap
peared and filed his answer to said Rule in the words and
figures as said answer is set forth in the record in this case
and it was agreed by the Attorney for the Commonwealth, the
defendant's counsel and the Court, that said answer should
be considered as swoni to and verified by the said defendant
and should have the same effect as if formally verified and
under the oath of said defendant.
And thereupon and on said 16th day of July, 1938, this
whole matter coming on to be heard by the Court, the follow
ing facts were admitted: That the records of this Court
showed that at the June term, 1938, of this Court, to-wit,
on the 1st day of July, 1938, a jury in this Court had brought
in, and there had been recorded in this Court on said date,
a verdict finding one J. C. Abdell guilty of murder in the
first degree and fixing his punishment at death and that on
said date and after said verdict, said jury on said date had
been formally discharged for the term and the said J. C.
Abdell had been remanded to the jail of the City of Norfolk
wherein he was confined and held continuously from said
date to the time of the hearing of this matter and
page 7 }■ that the said J. C. Abdell is the same J. C. Abdell
mentioned in the Rule in this cause; that on said
1st day of July, 1938, after the jury had rendered the verdict
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aforesaid, the said J. C. Abdell moved the Court to set aside
said verdict and grant him a new trial, which motion was
continued and set for argument and hearing on the 2nd day
of August, 1938, and was still pending and undisposed of at
the time of the hearing in the matter of the rule herein; that
the June term, 1938, of this Court ended on the 2nd day of
July, 1938, on which day the Court adjourned for said June
term, 1938, and a new term of this Court, to-wit, the July
term, 1938, began on the 4th day of July, 1938, and this
Court was in session for said last named term at the time
of the hearing of the matter involved herein; that the said
defendant a young lawyer qualified for the first time to prac
tice in this Court on the 6th day of July, 1938, and while
taking no part in the actual trial of the case against J. C.
Abdell in the examination of witnesses or in any argument
in which the verdict aforesaid was rendered was present
and in attendance at the trial of said case against J. C. Abdell
rendering such assistance and aid tliat he could'to W. H. Ven-
able, one of Abdell's main counsel, with whose law office he
was connected as a young lawyer just recently licensed to
practice law.
It was further admitted and conceded and agreed on the
hearing in this case that the City Council of the City of
Norfolk, Virginia, had not at any time either with or without
the approval of the Judge of the Corporation Court of the
City of Norfolk prescribed, promulgated or enforced any
rules for the preservation of the property and health
page 8 [- of the prisoners in said City jail or for the govern
ment of the prisoners in said jail.
- And the Court doth certify that in addition to the facts
hereinabove mentioned, the following evidence was introduced
on the hearing of this matter:
LEE F. LAWLER,
being first duly sworn, testified that he was the City Sergeant
of the City of Norfolk and as such in charge of the City
Jail of the City of Norfolk; that there was provided in said
City jail a room where Counsel for prisoners could and did
consult iDi'ivately and alone with their prisoner clients not
in the presence of jail officials or prisoners or other prisoners;
and he produced and there was introduced in evidence certain
printed rules copies of which he testified were posted in more
than six places in the City jail and were posted in each cell
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ill said jail but that no copy of such rules were posted in
the room where prisoners and their counsel consulted. Said
printed copy of said rules so produced and introduced as an
exhibit is filed with the evidence herein and is duly certified
by the judge of this Court as such exhibit so as to be used
at the hearing on appeal in this matter with the same effect
as in this court and so as to ob^date its being copied into the
record; and he testified that said rules
were made and promulgated by the personnel of the City
Sergeant's office, meaning himself and all his deputies,
especially those deputies having immediate charge of the
City jail; that he did not know of the mailing letters to jurors
and that it was violation of his rules; he further testified that
.he had received from the defendant after the Rule was issued
in this matter a letter in words and figures as fob
page 9 y lows:
^'July 14, 1938.




As you know I am a young lawyer who has been helping
Mr. Venable look up some evidence in the Abdell case. When
Mr. Venable went to Atlantic City last Saturday evening
he requested me, if Mr. Abdell called up and wanted any
thing while he was away, to go around to the jail in his
place, and I think he left the same word with Mr. Abdell.
Mr. Abdell did call on Monday or Tuesday while Mr. Ven
able was still away and I went around to see what he wanted.
I talked to him awhile, and when I was about to leave he gave
me ten or twelve letters to mail for him. He did not say
to whom they wera addressed nor anything about the con
tents of the letters. In taking them I thought I was doing
no more than saving some Deputy the trouble of mailing
them for him, and put them in the first mail box I came to.
I did not know of any regulation that you might have had
about matters of this kind or I would have certainly shown
them to you or some Deputy before I mailed them. If by not
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
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doing so I have caused you any trouble, I regret the matter
very much. I certainly had no conscious thought that I was
doing more than saving one of youy Deputies some trouble.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) MORRIS BERNARD GUTTERMAN.''
but that he could not testify that the defendant had mailed
the letters to the twelve jurors from Abdell of which the letter
mentioned and set forth in the evidence of W. J.
page 10 } Etheridge was, except as to the address a copy.
MR. W. J. ETHERIDGE,
subject to objection and exception as set out in Bill of Ex
ceptions No. 2 testified that he was one of the jury who tried
and convicted J. C. Abdell and brought in the verdict herein
before mentioned and that on July 12th, 1938, he received at




On July 1st at about 6:00 o 'clock, you voted to send me to
my death for a crime I did not commit nor would I dared to
of committed. I realize there is little or nothing you can do
about it now.
You voted to take the life of the only remaining parent of
that little boy you saw grab me around the neck and hold
me so tight in the Court Room the first day, and who, with
tears streaming down his cheeks said, 'Daddy, Daddy I want
you Daddy, I'm so sorry'. God bless his little heart.
I have served on the Jury of every Court in the City of
Norfolk over a period of 20 years, and little did I ever think
that I would some day face a Jury for a crime I can truth
fully say, I did not commit, any more than you may expect
to soine day have to face. You will have my blood, the blood
of an innocent man on your hands if I should die.
Remember the California Man you were told about who was
M. B. Gutteiman v. Commonwealtli of Virginia. 25
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hanged for killing a girl, yet 5 years later a Priest Confessed
to the Crime. Remember the Case of the young
page 11 [ man in Maine a few months ago who was Convicted
of Killing a Doctor and his wife, yet only 2 weeks
ago the newspapers Carried an account where another Man
has now Confessed to the crime.
These eases and many more were on Circumstancial Evi
dence. Now you, as a member of my Jury,, here convicted me
on the same grounds. I did Not Commit this crime. I am not
telling you this for your help because you cannot help me
now. My Conscience is clear and if necessary I am ready to
meet my God. But Remember that from now until the day you
meet your God, you may rest assured that my liberty, my life
and my blood will be on your hands. You helped to make
my children orphans.
If I have to die in the Electric Chair, I will pray to go out
of this world with no hate in my heart for anyone and I
hope that you were not the 'Impartial' Juror avIio I am in
formed said to the other members of the Jury Avhile sitting
on my case, that he would take pleasure in going to Rich
mond and turning on the current and I hope I will never Imow




that the eiiA'-elope in which said letter was contained was post
marked "Norfolk, Va., Jul. 11, 1938", and Avas addressed as
folloAvs:
"W. J. Etheridge,




It Avas further admitted that the other eleven jurors would
testify to the receipt by each of them of a similar letter on
July 12th, 1938, subject to the objection to such evidence and
exception thereto as is set out in Bill of Exceptions No. 2.
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And the Court doth certify that the foregoing
page 12 [■ facts and evidence were all the facts and evidence
produced on the hearing of this matter and that the
defendant thereupon moved the Court to dismiss the rule
against him herein on the ground that under the record here
in and such facts and evidence he was not guilty of any con
tempt of Court and on the further ground that if he were
ever guilty of any such contempt his answer purged him of
such contempt but the Court overruled said motion of said
defendant and entered the judgment contained in the record
against him to which action of the Court the defendant then
and there objected and excepted and prayed the Court to sign
and seal this his Bill of Exception No. 1 this 9th day of Au
gust, 1938, which is accordingly done.
EICHARD B. SPINDLE, (Seal)
Judge of Corporation Court of the City of
Norfolk.
Certified as an accurate typewritten copy of Bill of Ex
ception No. 1 signed by me in above^ entitled case.
Given under my hand this 9th day of August, 1938.
RICHARD B. SPINDLE,
Judge of the Corporation Court of the City
of Norfolk.
page 13 }■ In the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk.
Commonwealth
Morris Bernard Gutterman.
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 2.
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case when the
Conunonwealth introduced the witness W. J. Etheridge and
after he had testified that he was a member of the jury which
had convicted J. C. Abdell and that he had received on July
12th, 1938, through the mail a letter from J. C. Abdell who
was there confined in the City jail of the City of Norfolk,
the said W. J. Etheridge was asked to produce and intro-
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duce as evidence the letter so received by him as the same
is set forth in the testimony of said W. J. Etheridge as said
testimony is certified in Bill of Exception No. 1, at which
time the defendant herein objected to the production and
the introduction in evidence of said letter on the ground that
there was no evidence to connect said defendant with said
letter or the mailing of the same or to show said defendant
was cognizant of said letter or the contents thereof or to
show any connection of defendant in any way with that letter
or the mailing thereof. But the Court overruled said ob
jection and allowed said letter to be introduced in evidence,
to which action of the Court the defendant excepted and
prayed the Court to sign and seal this his Bill of Exception
No. 2 which is accordingly done this 9th day of August,
1938.
And the Court doth further certify that the
page 14 admission by the defendant that the other eleven
jurors would testify to the receipt by each of them
of a similar letter and would produce such letters as evi
dence was made expressly subject to the same objection and
exception as is contained in this Bill of Exception.
RICHARD B. SPINDLE, (Seal)
Judge of the Corporation Court of the City
of Norfolk.
Certified as an accurate typewritten copy of Bill of Ex
ception No. 2 signed'by me in above entitled case.
Given under my hand this 9th day of August, 1938.
RICHARD B. SPINDLE,
Judge of the Corporation Court of the City
of Norfolk.
page 15 [► Virginia:
In the Clerk's OflSce of the Corporation Court of the City
of Norfolk.
I, W. L. Prieur, Jr., Clerk of the said Corporation Court
of the City of Norfolk, do hereby certify that the foregoing
and annexed is a true transcript of the record in the suit of
Commonwealth of Virginia, plaintiff, v. Morris Bernard Gut-
terman, defendant, lately pending in said Court.
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
I further certify that said copy was not made up and com
pleted until the Commonwealth had had due notice of the
making of the same and the intention of the Defendant to
take an appeal therein.
Griven under my hand this 10th day of August, 1938.
W. L. PBIEUR, JR., Clerk.
Fee for this record: $15.25.
A Copy—Teste:
M. B. WATTS, C. C,
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Plaintiff in error v»as not guilty, under the Fourth sub
division of iieotion 4521 of the Code, of "luisbehaviour of an
officer of the court in his official capacity#**
"Official Capacity; The capacity in which a
person acts because he is an officer lawfully
appointed and qualified. **
Vol. 45 Corpus Juris, p 1085 text to which
note 25 is appended.
Mailing the Jstters for^Abdell was not an act done by
petitioner in his official capacity; any person coSLdThavF''^ ^
mailed tnose letters; acting as an agent to mail letters
for a prisoner uoes not require or necessitate a license to
practice law and is not an official act.
The Court cannot by the process of contempt exercise a
supervisory power over the general behaviour of the lawyers
qualified to practice before it; The process of contempt
extends only to misbehavior of a lawyer "in his official
capacity."
The following cases, frorti our sister state of Vvest Virginia,
-1-
eonstruing the inhentical clause In the West Virginia Gode^
are in point;
State V# Hansford (W* Va,) 2S S» S* 791
State Parsons (W. Va») 37 S» K, 648
II
The Court has a right by process of contempt to protect
witnesses, suitors and jurors frwu insult and assault while
on their way to the discharge of tneir duties in such court,
while discharging them there and on their return therefremj
but this protection by process of contempt only extends to
them, as expressed pithily in hatin e^do, rede.ujjnhh, et moryndo;
it cannot extend to them for an indefinite time when their
duties and services in the court have been finished, they have
been discharged and the term of the Court completed and adjournad.
-  "In re Jonnson t-1867)-20ni;nffr-®or7-per- Bowen, LV J. at ^7^
If the letter of Abdell to the individual jurors is to be
construed as an imputation of corruption to them In the trial of
his case or as charging them with violation of their oath, the
remedy is an indictment for criminal libel or a civil action for
lifeel and not the process of conteiapte
And even under such a proceeding petitioner could not de
held liable being an innocent agent. Although under the eooimon
law every distriluto^^of a libel was deemed guilty with its
author yet,
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